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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a crowdsourcing based
framework for myopic target tracking by designing an incentive-
compatible mechanism based optimal auction in a wireless sensor
network (WSN) containing sensors that are selfish and profit-
motivated. For typical WSNs which have limited bandwidth, the
fusion center (FC) has to distribute the total number of bits that
can be transmitted from the sensors to the FC among the sensors.
To accomplish the task, the FC conducts an auction by soliciting
bids from the selfish sensors, which reflect how much they value
their energy cost. Furthermore, the rationality and truthfulness
of the sensors are guaranteed in our model. The final problem
is formulated as a multiple-choice knapsack problem (MCKP),
which is solved by the dynamic programming method in pseudo-
polynomial time. Simulation results show the effectiveness of our
proposed approach in terms of both the tracking performance
and lifetime of the sensor network.
Index Terms—Crowdsourcing, target tracking, incentive-
compatible mechanism design, auctions, bandwidth allocation,
multiple-choice knapsack problem, dynamic programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is the practice of obtaining needed services,
ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group
of people, rather than from traditional employees or suppliers
[1]. Many of today’s sensing applications allow users carrying
devices with built-in sensors, such as sensors built in smart
phones, and automobiles, to contribute towards an inference
task with their sensing measurements, which is exactly an
application of crowdsourcing. For instance, today’s smart
phones are embedded with various sensors, such as camera,
microphone, accelerometer, and GPS, which can be used to
acquire information regarding a phenomenon of interest. An
advantage of such architectures is that they do not need a
dedicated sensing infrastructure for different inference tasks,
thereby providing cost effectiveness. Another advantage of
such architectures is that they allow ubiquitous coverage.
Systems and applications that rely on utilizing an infras-
tructure where crowdsourced sensing measurements of par-
ticipating users are used are poised to revolutionize many
sectors of our life. Some example application domains include
social networks, environmental monitoring [2], [3], green
computing [4], target localization and tracking [5], [6], [7], [8],
[9], healthcare [10] (such as predicting and tracking disease
patterns/outbreaks), and tracking traffic patterns [11], [12]. For
instance, the OpenSense project [2] involves the design of
a sensing infrastructure for real-time air quality monitoring
using heterogeneous sensors owned by the general public,
while [3] involves the design of a similar system to monitor
noise levels. GreenGPS [4] uses data from sensors installed
in automobiles to map fuel consumption on city streets and
construct fuel efficient routes between arbitrary end-points.
Various systems to estimate object locations and to track
them using smartphone sensors have also been proposed. For
instance, work reported in [6], [8] utilizes built-in sensors in
smartphones such as camera, digital compass and GPS, to
estimate a target location as well as monitor the velocity of
moving objects. In [5], [7], [9], proximity sensors in built-
in smartphones are used to track objects (such as lost/stolen
devices) installed with electronic tags (such as Bluetooth
or RFID tags). Such systems have important commercial
applications (such as tracking lost/stolen objects or accurately
estimating arrival time of buses) as well as defense related
applications (estimating the enemy’s vehicle position prior to
an attack).
Existing sensing applications and systems assume voluntary
participation of users, for example, [13], [11], [5], [6], [7], [8],
[9]. While participating in a sensing task, users consume their
own resources such as energy and processing power. Moreover,
users may also have concerns regarding their privacy. As
a result, existing applications and systems may suffer from
insufficient number of participants because it may not be
rational for the users to participate. Thus, there is a need
to design sensing architectures that can provide appropriate
incentives to the users to motivate their participation. Further-
more, users, being selfish in nature, may manipulate protocols
of the sensing architectures for their own benefits. Thus, a
critical property that any mechanism involving selfish entities
should exhibit is strategy-proofness or truthfulness. As has
been shown in [14], mechanisms that are not truthful are prone
to market manipulations and can have inefficient outcomes.
Most past work focusses on sensor management problems
without addressing selfish concerns of participants [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19]. Information based measures have been used
for sensor management in [15], [16] which maximize the
mutual information between the sensor measurements and
target state. Sensor selection strategies that minimize the
bound on the estimation error, which is the inverse of Fisher
Information [17], [18] are computationally more efficient than
the information based sensor selection methods [18]. In [19],
the Nondominating Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II method is
employed for the multi-objective optimization based sensor
selection problem. Since selecting a subset of informative
sensors out of N sensors in the network is an NP-hard combi-
natorial problem, in [20], the binary variable sensor selection
2problem is relaxed and solved using convex optimization.
Transmission of quantized measurements is required in typical
WSNs that have limited resources (energy and bandwidth).
This gives rise to the more general problem of bit allocation.
Given the total bandwidth constraint, the Fusion Center (FC)
determines the optimal bandwidth distribution for the channels
between the sensors and the FC. In [21], the myopic bandwidth
allocation problem is considered and the algorithms to solve
the problem, namely, convex relaxation, A-DP, GBFOS and
greedy search, are compared.
Market based mechanisms for sensor management have
started to gain attention only recently [22], [23], [24]. In [22],
the authors explored the possibility of using economic con-
cepts for sensor management without explicitly formulating
a specific problem. The authors in [23] used the concept
of Walrasian equilibrium [25] to model market based sensor
management. In [24], the authors also proposed a Walrasian
equilibrium based dynamic bit allocation scheme for tar-
get tracking in energy constrained wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) using quantized data. However, as shown in [26],
Walrasian markets can be unstable and can fail to converge
to the equilibrium. Furthermore, computing the equilibrium
prices and allocations can be computationally prohibitive.
Accordingly, the authors ([23] and references therein) propose
algorithms to compute an approximate equilibrium. Moreover,
the mechanisms proposed in [23], [24] are not truthful and are,
therefore, prone to market manipulations.
The main objective of this paper is to design a market-
based mechanism [27] to trade information for tracking
a target, with the mechanism being computationally effi-
cient, individually-rational (to rationalize user participation),
incentive-compatible (to ensure strategy-proofness), and prof-
itable (to ensure feasibility). However, as opposed to con-
ventional market scenarios, the problem at hand portrays two
unique characteristics– a) Here, the traded commodity in the
market is information. At what prices would information trade,
given that the prices users would want to sell their information
is dependent on their participatory costs?, and, b) The informa-
tion acquisition process is in a resource constrained environ-
ment with participants having limited energy, and bandwidth
availability for communication. How do we allocate resources
efficiently in such a resource constrained environment? To
answer both questions, we propose to use auctions [28], [27],
[29]. One of the chief virtues of auctions is their ability
to determine appropriate prices of traded commodities [30].
Further, there is also substantial agreement among economists
that auctions are the best way to allocate resources in a
resource constrained environment [31]. Essentially, auctions
seek an answer to the basic question ‘Who should get the
resources and at what prices?’
In our prior work [32], we limited our focus on the design
of an incentive-based mechanism for target localization via
sensor selection (which is a special case of the bit allocation
problem1). In this paper, we focus on the more general
1It should be noted that, for a given total number of bits per time step
that can be transmitted from sensors to the fusion center (FC), dynamic bit
allocation distributes the resources more efficiently, and thus provides better
estimation performance as compared to the sensor selection problem [20].
problem of designing an incentive-based mechanism for target
tracking while considering dynamic bit allocation. Specifically,
in this paper, we propose a reverse auction2 based mechanism
in which an auctioneer (FC) conducts an auction to estimate
the target location at each tracking step by soliciting bids from
the selfish users (sensors3). The bids of the sensors reflect how
much they value their energy costs. Moreover, the sensors’
valuations of their energy costs may also increase as the
residual energy depletes, which we also consider in our model.
Our auction mechanism is comprised of two components-
a) bandwidth allocation function, which determines how to
distribute the limited bandwidth (bits) between the sensors
and the FC, and, b) pricing function, which determines the
payment to be made to each user. The focus of this paper is
to design these two functions.
To address the participatory concerns of the selfish sensors,
we design the mechanism so that it is always in the best inter-
est of the selfish sensors to participate in the auction. Further,
our proposed auction mechanism is truthful so that it is not
prone to market manipulations. To implement the proposed
auction model in a computationally efficient manner, we use
dynamic programming by formulating the proposed mecha-
nism as a multiple-choice knapsack problem (MCKP) [33],
[34]. As is shown in the paper, the dynamic programming
approach finds the exact equilibrium of our model. Formally,
the key contributions of the paper are as follows.
• We propose an auction-based market mechanism to trade
information for tracking a target. The proposed mech-
anism is computationally efficient, individually-rational,
incentive-compatible (truthful), and profitable. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a market
mechanism for tracking a target using selfish users that
exhibits the aforementioned properties.
• We propose a pseudo-polynomial time procedure to im-
plement the proposed auction mechanism using dynamic
programming. The dynamic programming approach can
provably sustain the market at the exact equilibrium. Our
solution is thus stable.
• Via extensive simulations, we show the effectiveness of
our proposed mechanism, study its characteristics, and
also show the benefits of the “energy-awareness” of the
mechanism when the participatory costs (valuations) of
the users are dependent on their residual energy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the target tracking background. In Section III,
we introduce the basic assumptions and formulate the problem.
We analyze the incentive-based mechanism in Section IV. The
implementation of our proposed mechanism is discussed in
Section V as well as the case where the sensors’ valuations
are dependent on their residual energy. Simulation results are
presented in Section VI, and we conclude our work in Section
VII.
2A reverse auction is one in which the roles of buyers and seller are
reversed.
3In the rest of the paper, we refer to users as sensors, unless mentioned
explicitly.
3II. TARGET TRACKING IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
A. System Model
We consider a WSN consisting of N selfish sensors which
are uniformly deployed in a square region of interest (ROI) of
size b2. Note that, our work can handle any sensor deployment
pattern and the uniform sensor deployment is employed here
for ease of presentation. We assume that the target and all the
sensors are based on flat ground and have the same height,
so that we can formulate the problem with a 2-D model. The
target is assumed to emit a signal from location (xt, yt) at time
step t, and the FC estimates the position and velocity of the
target based on the sensor measurements. The state vector of
the target at time t is defined by xt = [xt yt x˙t y˙t]T , where
(x˙t, y˙t) are the target velocities. Table I gives the notations
we use in the paper. The target motion dynamics is defined
according to the following linear model,
xt+1 = Fxt + vt (1)
where vt is the zero-mean, Gaussian process noise with
covariance matrix Q where F and Q are defined as,
F =


1 0 D 0
0 1 0 D
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 ,Q = τ


D3
3 0
D2
2 0
0 D
3
3 0
D2
2
D2
2 0 D 0
0 D
2
2 0 D

 ,
(2)
In (2), D and τ denote the sampling time interval and the
process noise parameter respectively. We assume that the FC
has complete knowledge of the process model in (1).
We consider the isotropic power attenuation model for the
target as,
a2i,t =
P0
1 + d2i,t
(3)
where ai,t is the received signal amplitude at the ith sensor
at time step t, P0 is the emitted signal power from the target,
and di,t is the distance between the target and the ith sensor
at time step t, i.e., di,t =
√
(xt − xi)2 + (yt − yi)2. At time
step t, the received signal at sensor i is given by
zi,t = ai,t + ni,t (4)
The measurement noise samples ni,t are assumed to be inde-
pendent across time steps and across sensors and they follow
Gaussian distribution with parameters N (0, σ2). In order to
reduce the cost of communication, the sensor measurements,
zi,t’s, are quantized into m-bits before transmission to the FC.
The quantized measurement of sensor i at time step t, Di,t,
is defined as:
Di,t =


0 −∞ < zi,t < η1
1 η1 < zi,t < η2
.
.
.
L− 1 η(L−1) < zi,t <∞
(5)
where η = [η0, η1, . . . , ηL]T is the set of quantization thresh-
olds with η0 = −∞ and ηL =∞ and L = 2m is the number of
quantization levels. For simplicity, the quantization thresholds
are designed identically according to the Fisher Information
Notation Description
t time step
N no. of sensors
b size of ROI
xt target state vector at time t; to be estimated
(xi, yi) location of sensor i
di,t
distance between the target and
the ith sensor at time step t
Di,t quantized measurement of sensor i at time step t
M
total bandwidth constraint of the
system at each time step
JDi,t FIM obtained from the sensor i’s measurement
JPt FIM of the a priori information
v sensors’ valuation vector
vFC FC’s valuation per unit information
T
set of all possible combinations
of bidders’ value estimates
T
−i
set of all possible combinations of
bidders’ value estimates except sensor i
f probability distribution of bidders’ value estimate
p payment vector
q sensor’s bit allocation variable vector
Eci,t sensor i’s energy consumption at time t
U
FC
t FC’s utility at time t
Ui,t sensor i’s utility at time t
U˜i,t sensor i’s utility at time t if it lied
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN THE PAPER.
based heuristic quantization as in [35]. Then, given target state
xt at time step t, the probability that Di,t takes value l is,
p(Di,t = l|xt) = Q
(
ηl − ai
σ
)
−Q
(
ηl+1 − ai
σ
)
(6)
where Q(.) is the complementary distribution of the standard
normal distribution. Given xt, the sensor measurements be-
come conditionally independent, so the likelihood function of
Dt = [D1,t, D2,t, ..., DN,t]
T can be written as,
p(Dt|xt) =
N∏
i=1
p(Di,t|xt) (7)
In our work, we consider that the FC reimburses the sensors
for energy spent for transmission. By assuming that there
are no errors in data transmission, a simple model of energy
consumption of sensor i at time t for transmitting m bits over
its distance from the FC hi is considered as [36]
Eci,t(m,hi) = ǫamp ×m× h
2
i (8)
where ǫamp is assumed to be 10−8J/bit/m2.
B. Fisher Information with Quantized Measurements
Posterior Cramer-Rao Lower Bound (PCRLB) provides the
lower bound on estimation error variance for a Bayesian
estimator [37], which is represented as the inverse of the Fisher
Information Matrix (FIM),
E
{
[xˆt − xt][xˆt − xt]
T
}
≥ J−1t (9)
where xˆt is the estimate of the target location, and the FIM
is a function of the joint probability density function of the
4sensor measurements and the target location p(Dt,xt),
Jt = E[−∆
xt
xt
log p(Dt,xt)] (10)
= E[−∆xtxt log p(Dt|xt)] + E[−∆
xt
xt
log p(xt)]
= JDt + J
P
t
where, expectation is taken with respect to p(Dt,xt), and
∆xx , ▽x▽
T
x is the second order derivative operator. In (10),
the FIM is decomposed into two parts, where, JDt represents
the FIM corresponding to the sensor measurements, and JPt
represents the FIM corresponding to the a priori information.
The FIM corresponding to the sensor measurements, JDt , can
be further written as the summation of each sensor’s individual
FIM [18], [21] as,
JDt =
N∑
i=1
JDi,t =
N∑
i=1
∫
xt
JSi,t(xt)p(xt)dxt (11)
where JSi,t(xt) represents the standard FIM corresponding to
sensor i and can be written as,
JSi,t(xt) = E[−∆
xt
xt
log p(Di|xt)] =
4κi,ta
2
i,t
(1 + d2i )
2
× (12)

(xi − xt)2 (xi − xt)(yi − yt) 0 0
(xi − xt)(yi − yt) (yi − yt)2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


where
κi,t =
1
8πσ2
L−1∑
l=0
[
e−
(ηl−ai,t)
2
2σ2 − e−
(η(l+1)−ai,t)
2
2σ2
]2
p(Di = l|xt)
A detailed derivation of JSi,t(xt) can be found in [18], [21].
C. Particle Filtering based Target Tracking
In this paper, we employ sequential importance resampling
(SIR) particle filtering algorithm [38] to solve the nonlinear
Bayesian filtering problem, where the main idea is to find a
discrete representation of the posterior distribution p(xt|D1:t)
by using a set of particles xst with associated weights wst ,
p(xt|D1:t) ≈
Ns∑
s=1
wst δ(xt − x
s
t ) (13)
where, Ns denotes the total number of particles. Algorithm
1 provides a summary of SIR particle filtering for the target
tracking problem, where T denotes the number of time steps
over which the target is tracked and p(Dt+1|xst+1) has been
obtained according to (6) and (7). Resampling step avoids the
situation that all but one of the importance weights are close
to zero [38].
III. FORMULATION OF THE AUCTION DESIGN PROBLEM
Our problem belongs to the general area of mechanism
design [27]. Below we first describe the mechanism design
problem in general before formulating our auction in the
context of sensor management for tracking.
Algorithm 1 SIR Particle Filter for target tracking
1: Set t = 0. Generate initial particles xs0 ∼ p(x0) with
∀s , ws0 = N
−1
s .
2: while t ≤ T do
3: xst+1 = Fx
s
t + υt (Propagating particles)
4: p(xt+1|D1:t) =
1
Ns
∑Ns
s=1 δ(xt+1 − x
s
t+1)
5: Obtain sensor data Dt+1
6: wst+1 ∝ p(Dt+1|x
s
t+1) (Updating weights)
7: wst+1 =
wst+1
∑Ns
s=1 w
s
t+1
(Normalizing weights)
8: xˆt+1 =
∑Ns
s=1 w
s
t+1x
s
t+1
9: {xst+1, N
−1
s } = Resampling(xst+1, wst+1)
10: t = t+ 1
11: end while
A. Mechanism Design
Consider n agents where each agent i ∈ {1, · · · , n} has
some private information which is referred to as his type ti. An
output specification maps each type vector t = (t1, · · · , tn) to
a set of allowed outputs. Depending on his private information,
each agent has his own preferences over the possible outputs.
The preferences of agent i are given by a valuation function vi
that assigns a real number vi(ti, q) to each possible output q.
Each agent i reports his type as tˆi to the mechanism. Based on
the vector of announced types tˆ = (tˆ1, · · · , tˆn), the mechanism
computes an output q(tˆ) and a payment pi(tˆ) to each of the
agents. The utility of agent i is pi(tˆ) + vi(ti, q(tˆ)), which the
agents wants to optimize. The following two properties should
be exhibited by the mechanism.
• Incentive Compatibility: Each agent should be able to
maximize his utility by reporting his true type ti to the
mechanism so that the mechanism is truthful. In other
words,
pi(ti, tˆ−i)+vi(ti, q(ti, tˆ−i)) ≥ pi(tˆi, tˆ−i)+vi(ti, q(tˆi, tˆ−i))
• Individual Rationality: The utility of an agent should be
non-negative, so that it is rational for him to participate
in the game.
B. Our Auction Model
The sensors, in our model, compete to sell the information
contained in their measurements to the FC, and comprise the
set of bidders (potential sellers) in the sensor network. We
assume that each bidder i has a valuation vi per unit of energy,
and that vi is the true valuation of i. Further, we assume
that the FC will derive a benefit from performing the location
estimation and assume that the valuation of the FC per unit
of information of the selected sensors is vFC 4. The FC is
assumed to be unaware of the true valuations of the sensors
so that the sensors have to advertise their valuations at the
beginning of the target tracking process to the FC. This gives
the sensors an opportunity to lie about their valuations hoping
for an extra benefit. For instance, a sensor may understate its
4vFC , for instance, can reflect the valuation of the entity trying to find the
lost/stolen object as discussed in [5], [7], [9]
5valuation per unit energy in the hope of making the FC buy
information with finer quantization (larger number of bits),
which countervails its loss for announcing valuation lower than
the truthful one, than what the FC should optimally buy it
at. Or it may exaggerate its valuation that might increase the
payment made to the sensor sufficiently to compensate for any
resulting decrease in the resolution of the information bought.
We assume that the FC’s uncertainty about the value esti-
mate of bidder i can be described by a continuous probability
distribution fi : [ai, bi] → R+ over a finite interval [ai, bi],
where ai is the lowest possible value which i might assign
to its data, and bi is the highest possible value which i
might assign to its data, and −∞ ≤ ai ≤ bi ≤ ∞.
Fi : [ai, bi] → [0, 1] denotes the cumulative distribution
function, where Fi(vi) =
∫ vi
ai
fi(ti)dti. We let T denote the
set of all possible combinations of bidders’ value estimates:
T = [a1, b1]× . . .× [an, bn]
Also, for any bidder i, the set of all the combinations of the
other bidders’ value estimates is
T−i = [a1, b1]× . . .× [ai−1, bi−1]× [ai+1, bi+1]× . . .× [an, bn]
The value estimates of the N sensors are assumed to be
statistically independent random variables. Thus, the joint pdf
of the vector v = (v1, . . . , vN ) is
f(v) =
∏
j∈{1,2,...N}
fj(vj) (14)
We assume that bidder i treats other sensors’ value estimates
in a similar way as the FC does. Thus, both the FC and the
bidder i consider the joint pdf of the vector of values for all
the sensors other than i (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vN ) to be
f−i(v−i) =
∏
j∈{1,...,i−1,i+1,N}
fj(vj) (15)
C. Problem Formulation
Based on the above definitions and assumptions, we con-
sider a direct revelation mechanism, where the bidders simul-
taneously and confidentially announce their value estimates to
the FC. The FC then determines the number of bits it should
buy from each sensor and how much it should pay them. Thus,
our objective is to maximize the FC’s utility as a function of
the bit allocations and the payment vector. We also assume
that the FC and the sensors are risk neutral. By using the
trace of the FIM as the metric of tracking performance, the
sensors have additively separable utility for money and the
commodity (information) being traded [29].
1) Utility Functions: At time step t, we define the expected
utility UFCt for the FC from the auction mechanism as
UFCt (p,q) =
∫
T
[
vFC tr
(
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v)J
D
i,t(qi,m = m)
+JPt
)
−
N∑
i=1
pi(v)
]
f(v)dv
(16)
where p = [p1, . . . , pN ] is the payment vector and pi is
the expected payment that the FC makes to sensor i. q =
[qT1 , . . . ,q
T
N ]
T and qi = [qi,0, . . . , qi,m, . . . , qi,M ]T are both
Boolean vectors where q represents the bit allocation state of
all the sensors and qi represents the bit allocation state of
sensor i, i.e., qi,m = 1 when sensor i transmits m bits, and
qi,m = 0 if sensor i does not transmit its data to the FC in
m bits. Thus
M∑
m=0
mqi,m is the number of bits allocated to
sensor i. Note that both p and q are functions of the vector of
announced value estimates v = [v1, . . . , vN ], and we ignore
the time index t for p, q and the values v for notational
simplicity. Since sensor i knows that its value estimate is vi,
its expected utility Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) at time t is described as
Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) =
∫
T
−i
[
pi(v)− viE
c
i,t(qi,v)
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
(17)
where dv−i = dv1 . . .dvi−1dvi+1 . . . dvn. As shown in (8),
Eci,t(qi(v), hi) = ǫamp× (
M∑
m=0
mqi,m)×h2i , where hi is not a
variable, so here we use simplified notation of Eci,t(qi(v), hi)
as Eci,t(qi,v). On the other hand, if sensor i claimed that wi
was its value estimate when vi was its true value estimate, its
expected utility U˜i would be
U˜i,t =
∫
T
−i
[
pi(wi,v−i)− viE
c
i,t(qi, wi,v−i)
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
where (wi,v−i) = (v1, . . . vi−1, wi, vi+1 . . . vn).
2) The Optimization Problem: Thus, the auction mech-
anism based bit allocation problem at time step t can be
explicitly formulated as follows:
maximize
q
UFCt (p,q)
subject to Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, . . .N} (18a)
m ∈ {0, . . .M} , ∀vi ∈ [ai, bi]
Ui,t ≥ U˜i,t, i ∈ {1, . . .N} (18b)
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
mqi,m ≤M (18c)
M∑
m=0
qi,m = 1, i ∈ {1, . . .N} (18d)
qi,m ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, . . .N} ,m ∈ {1, . . .M}
(18e)
Below we describe each constraint in detail.
• Individual-Rationality (IR) constraint (18a): We assume
that the FC cannot force a sensor to participate in an
auction. If it did not participate in the auction, the sensor
would not get paid, but also would not have any energy
cost, so its utility would be zero. Thus, to guarantee that
the sensors will participate in the auction, this condition
must be satisfied.
• Incentive-Compatibility (IC) constraint (18b): We assume
that the FC can not prevent any sensor from lying
about its value estimate if the sensor is expected to gain
from lying. Thus, to prevent sensors from lying, honest
6responses must form a Nash equilibrium in the auction
game.
• Bandwidth Limitation (BL) constraint (18c): The FC can
buy no more than M bits from all the sensors.
• Number of quantization Levels (NQL) constraint (18d):
Each sensor uses only one quantization level.
• qi,m (18e) is a Boolean variable.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE AUCTION DESIGN PROBLEM
In this section, we analyze the optimization problem pro-
posed in Section III-C. We define
Bi,t(qi, vi) =
∫
T
−i
Eci,t(qi,v)f−i(v−i)dv−i (19)
at time step t for any sensor i with value estimate vi. So
Bi,t(qi, vi) denotes the expected amount of energy that sensor
i would spend for communication with the FC conditioned on
the valuations of the other sensors v−i.
Our first result is a simplified characterization of the IC
constraint of the feasible auction mechanism.
Lemma 1: The IC constraint holds if and only if the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
1 if vi ≤ wi then Bi,t(qi, vi) ≥ Bi,t(qi, wi) (20)
2 Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) = Ui,t(pi,qi, bi) +
bi∫
vi
Bi,t(qi, vi)dvi (21)
Proof: We first show the “only if” part. Without loss of
generality, consider that vi ≤ wi. We first consider the case
that bidder i claimed that wi is his value estimate, when vi is
its true value estimate.
Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) =
∫
T
−i
[
pi(v) − E
c
i,t(qi,v)vi
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
≥
∫
T
−i
[
pi(v−i, wi)− E
c
i,t(qi,v−i, wi)vi
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
=
∫
T
−i
[
pi(v−i, wi)− E
c
i,t(qi,v−i, wi)wi
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
+
∫
T
−i
[
wiE
c
i,t(qi,v−i, wi)
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
−
∫
T
−i
[
viE
c
i,t(qi,v−i, wi)
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
= Ui,t(pi,qi, wi)
+ (wi − vi)
∫
T
−i
Eci,t(qi,v−i, wi)f−i(v−i)dv−i
So we can get,
Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) ≥ Ui,t(pi,qi, wi)+(wi−vi)Bi,t(qi, wi) (22)
Thus, the IC constraint is equivalent to (22). We now show
that (22) implies (20) and (21). By switching the roles of vi
and wi, we have
Ui,t(pi,qi, wi) ≥ Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) + (vi −wi)Bi,t(qi, vi) (23)
Combining (22) and (23), we can see that
(wi − vi)Bi,t(qi, wi) ≤ Ui,t(pi,qi, vi)− Ui,t(pi,qi, wi)
≤ (wi − vi)Bi,t(qi, vi)
from which we can derive (20).
Define δ = wi − vi, these inequalities can be written for
any δ → 0
δBi,t(qi, vi + δ) ≤ Ui,t(pi,qi, vi)− Ui,t(pi,qi, vi + δ)
≤ δBi,t(qi, vi)
Thus Bi,t(x, vi) is a decreasing function and it is, therefore,
Riemann integrable. We then write the utility function of
sensor i for all vi ∈ [ai, bi] as
Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) = Ui,t(pi,qi, bi) +
bi∫
vi
Bi,t(qi, vi)dvi
which gives us (21).
Now we must show the “if” part of Lemma 1, i.e., the
conditions in Lemma 1 also imply the IC constraint. Suppose
vi ≤ wi, then (20) and (21) give us:
Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) = Ui,t(pi,qi, wi) +
wi∫
vi
Bi,t(qi, ri)dri
≥ Ui,t(pi,qi, wi) +
wi∫
vi
Bi,t(qi, wi)dri
= Ui,t(pi,qi, wi) + (wi − vi)Bi,t(qi, wi)
Similarly, if vi ≥ wi,
Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) = Ui,t(pi,qi, wi)−
vi∫
wi
Bi,t(qi, ri)dri
≥ Ui,t(pi,qi, wi)−
vi∫
wi
Bi,t(qi, wi)dri
= Ui,t(pi,qi, wi) + (wi − vi)Bi,t(qi, wi)
So (22) can be derived from (20) and (21). Thus, the conditions
in Lemma 1 also imply the IC constraint. This proves the
lemma.
A. Optimal Auction Based Bit Allocation Mechanism
Based on Lemma 1, problem (18) can be simplified as
follows.
Theorem 4.1: The optimal auction of (18) is equivalent to
maximize
q
∫
T
Yt(q,v)f(v)dv
subject to
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
mqi,m ≤M
M∑
m=0
qi,m = 1, i ∈ {1, . . .N}
qi,m ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, . . .N} ,m ∈ {1, . . .M}
(24)
where Yt(q,v) = vFC tr
(
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v)J
D
i,t(qi,m = m) + J
P
t
)
−
N∑
i=1
Eci,t(qi,v)
(
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)
and the payment to sensor i is
7given by
pi(v) = viE
c
i,t(qi,v) +
bi∫
vi
Eci,t(qi,v−i, ri)dri (25)
Proof: We may write the FC’s objective function (16) as
UFC(pi,q)
=
∫
T
[
vFC
(
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v)J
D
i (qi,m = m) + J
P
)
−
N∑
i=1
pi(v)
]
f(v)dv +
N∑
i=1
∫
T
viE
c
i,t(qi,v)f(v)dv
−
N∑
i=1
∫
T
viE
c
i,t(qi,v)f(v)dv
=
∫
T
vFC
(
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v)J
D
i (qi,m = m) + J
P
)
f(v)dv
−
N∑
i=1
∫
T
viE
c
i,t(qi,v)f(v)dv
−
[
N∑
i=1
∫
T
(
pi(v)− viE
c
i,t(qi,v)
)
f(v)dv
]
(26)
By (20) of Lemma 1, we know that:∫
T
(
pi(v)− viE
c
i,t(qi,v)
)
f(v)dv
=
bi∫
ai
Ui,t(pi,qi, vi)fi(vi)dvi
=
bi∫
ai

Ui,t(pi,qi, bi) +
bi∫
vi
Bi,t(qi, wi)dwi

 fi(vi)dvi
= Ui,t(pi,qi, bi) +
bi∫
ai
wi∫
ai
fi(vi)Bi,t(qi, wi)dvidwi
= Ui,t(pi,qi, bi) +
bi∫
ai
Fi(wi)Bi,t(qi, wi)dwi
= Ui,t(pi,qi, bi) +
∫
T
Fi(vi)E
c
i,t(qi,v)f−i(v−i)dv
(27)
Substituting (27) into (26) gives us:
UFCt (p,q)
=
∫
T
[
vFC
(
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v)J
D
i (qi,m = m) + J
P
)
−
N∑
i=1
viE
c
i,t(qi,v)
]
f(v)dv −
N∑
i=1
Ui,t(pi,qi, bi)
−
N∑
i=1
∫
T
Fi(vi)E
c
i,t(qi,v)f−i(v−i)dv
=
∫
T
[
vFC
(
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v)J
D
i (qi,m = m) + J
P
)
−
N∑
i=1
viE
c
i,t(qi,v)
]
f(v)dv
−
N∑
i=1
∫
T
Fi(vi)E
c
i,t(qi,v)
f(v)
fi(vi)
dv −
N∑
i=1
Ui,t(pi,qi, bi)
(28)
In (28), p appears only in the last term of the objective
function. Also, by the IR constraint, we know that
Ui,t(pi,qi, bi) ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, . . .N}
Thus, to maximize (28) subject to the constraints, we must
have
Ui,t(pi,qi, bi) = 0, i ∈ {1, . . .N}
Combining this condition with (17), (19) and (21), we get
Ui,t(pi,qi, vi) =
bi∫
vi
Bi,t(qi, vi)dvi
=
bi∫
vi
∫
T
−i
Eci,t(qi,v)f−i(v−i)dv−idvi
=
∫
T
−i
bi∫
vi
Eci,t(qi,v−i, ri)drif−i(v−i)dv−i
=
∫
T
−i
[
pi(v)− viE
c
i,t(qi,v)
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
where the last two equations give the formulation of the
payment in (25). Thus, if the FC pays each sensor according
to Equation (25), then the IR constraint is satisfied, as well
as the best possible value of the last term in (28) is obtained,
which is zero. So we can simplify the objective function of
our optimization problem to (27) subject to the three remaining
constraints. Thus, Theorem 4.1 follows.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISM
In this section, we consider the algorithm to obtain the
solution for the proposed mechanism. We first study the
optimal algorithm to solve our optimization problem in (32),
and then the case when sensors’ valuations are dependent on
their residual energy.
A. Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problems
The knapsack problem is one of the most important prob-
lems in discrete programming [39], and it has been intensively
studied for both its theoretical importance and its applications
in industry and financial management. The knapsack problem
can be described as: given a set of n items with profit pi and
weight wi and a knapsack with capacity c, select a subset of
the items so as to maximize the total profit of the knapsack
8while the total weights does not exceed c
maximize
xi
n∑
i=1
pixi
subject to
n∑
i=1
wixi ≤ c
xi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, . . .N} ,
(29)
There are several types of problems in the family of the
knapsack problems. The multiple-choice knapsack problem
(MCKP) occurs when the set of items is partitioned into
classes and the binary choice of taking an item is replaced
by the selection of exactly one item out of each class of items
[33]. Assume that m classes N1, . . . , Nm of items are to be
packed in a knapsack with capacity c. Each item j ∈ Ni has
a profit pi,j and weight wi,j . The problem is how to choose
one item from each class to maximize the total profit of the
knapsack while the total weight does not exceed c. The binary
variables xi,j are introduced to represent that item j is taken
from class Ni, the MCKP is formulated as [33] [34]:
maximize
xi,j
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
pi,jxi,j
subject to
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
wi,jxi,j ≤ c
∑
j∈Ni
xi,j = 1, i ∈ {1, . . .m}
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, . . .N} ,m ∈ Ni
(30)
where pi,j , wi,j and c are assumed to be nonnegative integers,
with class Ni having size ni so that the total number of items
is n =
∑m
i=1 ni. By formulating a recursion form, the MCKP
can be solved optimally by the dynamic programming method
in pseudo-polynomial time with acceptable computation cost
when the number of sensors and the bit constraint are not
large.
B. Optimal Solution by Dynamic Programming
Substituting (8) into (24), the objective function Yt be-
comes:
Yt(q,v)
= vFC
(
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v) tr
(
JDi,t(qi,m = m)
)
+ tr
(
JPt
))
−
N∑
i=1
(
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)(( M∑
m=0
mqi,m
)
ǫamph
2
i
)
=
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v)
[
vFC tr
(
JDi,t(qi,m = m)
)
−mǫamph
2
i
(
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)]
+ vFC tr
(
JPt
)
(31)
where the last term is not subject to the solutions of
the optimization problem. Thus, by denoting Vi,m =
vFC tr
(
JDi,t(qi,m = m)
)
− mǫamph2i
(
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)
, the opti-
mization problem in (24) can be written as:
maximize
q
∫
T
[
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
Vi,mqi,m
]
f(v)dv
subject to
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
mqi,m ≤M
M∑
m=0
qi,m = 1, i ∈ {1, . . .N}
qi,m ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, . . .N} ,m ∈ {1, . . .M}
(32)
Observe that, given v, (32) is a Multiple Choice Knapsack
Problem (MCKP), which is an extension of the Knapsack
Problem (KP) [33]. We interpret our optimal auction based
bit allocation problem as a MCKP as follows: In the WSN
consisting of N sensors, information to be transmitted by each
sensor i has M +1 variants (bits) where the m-th variant has
weight wi,m = m and utility value Vi,m. As the network can
carry only a limited capacity M , the objective is to select one
variant of each sensor such that the overall utility value is
maximized without exceeding the capacity constraint.
The MCKP can be solved by the dynamic programming
approach in pseudo polynomial time with O(NM) operations
[39], [33]. Let bl(y) denote the optimal solution to the MCKP
defined on the first l sensors with restricted capacity y
bl(y) =
max


l∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,mVi,m
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
l∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
mqi,m ≤ y,
M∑
m=0
qi,m = 1, i ∈ {1, . . . l} ,
qi,m ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, . . . l} ,
m ∈ {0, . . .M}


(33)
and we assume that bl(y) = −∞ if y ≤ 0, l > 0 or y < 0,
l = 0. Initially we set b0(y) = 0 for y = 0, . . .M . We use the
following recursion to compute bl(y) for l = 1, . . . , N :
bl(y) = max
k=0,...,y
{bl−1(y − k) + Vl,k} (34)
.
.
.
bN(M) = max
k=0,...,M
{bN−1(M − k) + VN,k}
To explain the dynamic programming algorithm, we con-
struct the trellis for N +1 stages and M +1 states associated
with each stage [21]. Fig. 1 gives an example trellis for
N = 5 and M = 3, which contains 6 stages and 4 states.
For example, b1(1) = max {b0(1) + V1,0, b0(0) + V1,1} and
b3(2) = max {b2(2) + V3,0, b2(1) + V3,1, b2(0) + V3,2}. Thus,
the optimal solution is found as b = bN(M). Note that to get
the optimal bit allocation, the solution q needs to be recorded
at each step corresponding to the optimal bl(y). On the other
hand, the dynamic programming algorithm for our optimiza-
tion problem is pseudo polynomial and has the complexity
O(NM) [34]. Therefore, the optimality of the problem (32)
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Fig. 1. Trellis of the dynamic programming algorithm for time step t
Algorithm 2 Payment Calculation
1: for i = 1 : N do
2: Calculate the total number of bits sensor i is assigned
to through the optimal solution q0i of (24), Ri =
M∑
m=0
mqi,m.
3: Set the value estimate of sensor i to bi, run our
mechanism again
4: if sensor i is still assigned Ri bits then
5: pi = biEci,t(q
0
i ,v)
6: else
7: There must be at least one point between vi and bi
above which less than Ri will be assigned to sensor
i. We apply bisection method to find the thresholds.
8: repeat
9: Bisection method.
10: until finding the point above which sensor i is not
assigned any number of bits.
11: Assume there are n thresholds totally. Note that n ≤
Ri.
12: Denote the thresholds as w1i , . . . wni and the corre-
sponding solution vectors as q1i , . . . ,qn−1i .
13: Then pi = w1iEci,t(q0i ,v) + (w2i − w1i )Eci,t(q1i ,v) +
. . .+ (wni − w
n−1
i )E
c
i,t(q
n−1
i ,v).
14: end if
15: end for
is guaranteed and the rationality and the truthfulness properties
of our incentive-based mechanism are maintained.
The payment to each sensor can be calculated from (25).
The key point is to find the thresholds between vi and bi above
which the sensors will be assigned different number of bits
compared to the original optimal solution of (24). The pseudo-
code of the detailed algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
C. Residual Energy Dependent Valuations
So far, we have assumed that the valuation of the sensors
are invariant of the amount of residual energy of the sensors
over time. We now relax this assumption and consider that the
(true) valuations of the sensors are dependent on their residual
energy. Therefore, the remaining energy of the sensors are
included in their utility functions,
Uˆi,t(pi,qi, vi) =
∫
T
−i
[
pi(v) − vig(ei,t−1)E
c
i,t(qi,v)
]
f−i(v−i)dv−i
(35)
where ei,t−1 is the remaining energy of sensor i at the
beginning of time t − 1, i.e., ei,t−1 = ei,t−2 − Eci,t−1, so
that including g(ei,t−1) makes the problem more general, and
the new objective function Yˆt of (24) becomes
Yˆt = vFC tr
(
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=0
qi,m(v)J
D
i,t(qi,m = m) + J
P
t
)
−
N∑
i=1
g(ei,t−1)E
c
i,t(qi,v)
(
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
) (36)
and the corresponding value of Vi,m in (32) is
Vˆi,m = vFC tr
(
JDi,t(qi,m = m)
)
− h(ei,t−1)mǫamph
2
i
(
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)
Referring to Section V-B, we can find that the target tracking
problem with residual energy based valuation can also be
mapped to a MCKP and solved by the dynamic programming
method in pseudo-polynomial time. We assume that the FC
knows the energy status of all the sensors at each time step,
so the FC and the sensors decide how the value estimate of the
sensors change with their remaining energy at the beginning
of the tracking task.
VI. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we study the dynamics of our proposed
incentive-based target tracking mechanism in a sensor net-
work. In the experiments, N = 25 sensors are deployed
uniformly in the ROI with the size 50m× 50m and the FC is
located at xFC = −22, yFC = 20. Note that our model can
handle any sensor deployment pattern as long as the sensor
locations are known to the FC in advance. The signal power
at distance zero is P0 = 1000. The target motion follows
the white noise acceleration model with τ = 2.5 × 10−3.
The variance of the measurement noise is selected as σ = 1.
The prior distribution about the state of the target, p(x0), is
assumed to be Gaussian with the covariance matrix Σ0 =
diag[σ2x σ
2
x 0.01 0.01] where 3σx = 2 so that the initial
location of the target stays in the ROI with high probability.
The pdf of the value estimate of sensor i, vi, is assumed to
be uniformly distributed between ai and bi with ai = 0.1 and
bi = 1, and the value estimate of the FC is assumed to be
vFC = 1. The performance of the target location estimator
is determined in terms of the mean square error (MSE) at
each time step over 100 Monte Carlo trials and the number of
particles of each Monte Carlo trial is Ns = 5000.
We first consider the implementation of our optimal auction
based target tracking procedure as illustrated in Section V-B,
where the valuations of the sensors do not vary with their
residual energy. In the target motion model, measurements are
assumed to be taken at regular intervals of D = 1.25 seconds
and we observe the target for 20 time steps. The mean of
10
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Time Step
N
um
be
r o
f S
el
ec
te
d 
Se
ns
or
s
 
 
M=5
M=8
(a)
0 5 10 15 20
150
200
250
300
350
Time Step
Ut
ili
ty
 o
f t
he
 F
C
 
 
M=5
M=8
(b)
0 5 10 15 20
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Time Step
M
SE
 
 
M=5
M=8
(c)
0 5 10 15 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Time Step
Ut
ili
ty
 w
ith
ou
t P
rio
r
 
 
M=5
M=8
(d)
Fig. 2. Bit allocation with M = 5 and M = 8 (a) The number of selected sensors. (b) The utility of the FC. (c) MSE at each time step. (d) The utility of
the FC with prior information excluded.
the prior distribution about the target state is assumed to be
µ0 = [−23 − 23 2 2]T . Two different values of M , namely 5
and 8, are considered to examine the impact of total number
of available bits. In Fig. 2(a), we show the number of sensors
that are selected at each time step. And the corresponding
tracking MSE is shown in Fig. 2(c). We can see that around
time steps 4, 9, 14 and 19, the target is relatively close to
some sensor, and fewer sensors are activated. When the target
is not relatively close to any sensor in the network, during
time periods 5-8, 12-13 and 18-19, the uncertainty about the
target is relatively high, which increases the estimation error,
so that more sensors are activated. Fig. 2(b) shows the total
utility of the FC at each time step. Note that because of the
accumulated information, the utility of the FC increases as
time goes by and saturates during the last ten time steps. In
Fig. 2(d), we also show the utility of the FC when the term
due to prior FIM, JPt , is not included in the expression for the
utility function given in (16). Due to the low noise environment
and the accumulation of the information, JPt contains more
information and the contribution of the data to the utility
function as a function of time diminishes. This is evident in
Fig. 2(d) in that we observe a decreasing trend of the utility
function as a function of time. Moreover, for all the results, we
observe that when we have more number of bits (resources)
to allocate, the performance in terms of tracking performance
and the gains of the FC is better, i.e., results for M = 8 are
better than those for M = 5.
In Fig. 3, we study the utility of the FC (Fig. 3(a)) and
the corresponding MSE (Fig. 3(b)) when there are different
number of users in the network. The figures show that as
the number of sensors in the WSN increases, the utility
of the FC increases, and the corresponding MSE decreases.
It is because as the sensor density in the ROI increases,
the chances of the FC selecting more informative sensors
that require less payment increase at each tracking step. In
other words, competition among sensors increases as sensor
density increases, thereby making sensors participate with
lesser payments. Also, the FC’s utility and the MSE saturate
when the number of sensors in the ROI is large. This is
because, as has been observed in economic theory, a large
number of competitors in a market correspond to a scenario of
perfect competition and result in the market prices to saturate.
Note that when N = 9 and 16, the utility of the FC decrease
and the MSE diverges after a certain time. This is due to the
fact that the number of sensors is not sufficient for accurate
tracking over the large ROI.
Now we consider the case mentioned in Section V-C
where the sensors value their remaining energy. In (1), we
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Fig. 3. With different number of sensors in the ROI (a) The utility of the FC. (b) The MSE at each time step.
consider D = 1 second and the observation length is 40
seconds. The mean of the prior distribution is assumed to
be µ0 = [−10 − 11 2 2]T and the other parameters are
kept the same. The target moves back and forth between
two different points. During the first and the third 10 second
intervals, the target moves as described by model (1) in the
forward direction. At other times during the second and fourth
10 second intervals, the target moves in the reverse direction
with all other parameters fixed. For the function g(ei,t−1) in
(35), we take an example where the value estimates of the
sensors increase as their remaining energy decreases according
to g(ei,t−1) = 1/(ei,t−1/Ei,0)k, where Ei,0 is the initial
energy of each sensor at the initial time step, and the power
k controls the increasing speed. In Fig. 4, we show a) the
remaining number of active sensors in the WSN of the FIM
based bit allocation algorithm in [21], b) our auction based bit
allocation without residual energy consideration, and, c) when
residual energy is considered with different exponent k. Note
that in [21], the property of the determinant of the FIM brought
the suboptimality of the approximate dynamic programming
method. Here, to compare with our work, we employ the trace
of the FIM as the bit allocation metric to get the optimal
solutions using dynamic programming. For FIM based bit
allocation algorithm and our algorithm without residual energy
consideration, a specific bandwidth allocation maximizes the
FC’s utility for a given target location, resulting in the same
set of sensors to be repeatedly selected (as the target travels
back to pre-visited locations) until the sensors die (sensors
are defined to be dead when they run out of their energy).
Thus, those sensors die earlier than the others and the number
of active sensors decreases rapidly. However, the increase of
the value estimate based on residual energy prevents the more
informative sensors from being selected repeatedly because
they become more expensive if they have already been selected
earlier. In other words, on an average, sensors are allocated
lesser number of bits as their residual energy decreases.
Moreover, the larger the exponent k is, the more the sensors
value their remaining energy. We define the lifetime of the
sensor network as the time step at which the network becomes
non-functional (we say that the network is non-functional
when a specified percentage α of the sensors die [40]). For
example, we assume α = 0.6, in the energy unaware case,
the lifetime of the network is around 22. However, by our
algorithm, the lifetime of the network gets extended to 30
when k = 3, and even gets extended to the last time step
when the tracking task ends with k = 15 or k = 30, i.e., the
network keeps functional until the last tracking step.
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Fig. 4. The remaining number of active sensors in the WSN
Corresponding to Fig. 4, in Fig. 5, we study the tradeoff
of considering the function g(ei,t−1) = 1/(ei,t−1/Ei,0)k in
terms of the utility of the FC (Fig. 5(a)) and MSE (Fig.
5(b)). As shown in Fig. 5(b), the FIM based bit allocation
algorithm gives the lowest tracking MSE because the sensors
with highest Fisher information are always selected by the
FC. For our algorithm without energy consideration and with
residual energy considered as k = 1 and k = 3, the loss
of the estimation error and the utility of FC are very small.
However, the loss increases when k increases to 15 and 30.
This is because when the sensors increase their valuations
more aggressively, they become much more expensive after
being selected for a few times. Then the FC, in order to
maximize its utility, can only afford to select those cheaper
(potentially non-informative) sensors and allocate bits to them.
In other words, depending on the characteristics of the energy
concerns of the participating users, the tradeoff between the
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Fig. 5. With residual energy consideration (a) The utility of the FC. (b) The MSE at each time step.
estimation performance and the lifetime of the sensor network
is automatically achieved.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed a mechanism for the
dynamic bandwidth allocation problem in the myopic target
tracking problem by considering the sensors to be selfish and
profit-motivated. To determine the distribution of the limited
bandwidth and the pricing function for each sensor, the FC
conducts an auction by soliciting bids from the sensors, which
reflects how much they value their energy cost. Furthermore,
our model guaranteed the rationality and truthfulness of the
sensors. We implemented our model by formulating the opti-
mization problem as a MCKP, which is solved by dynamic
programming optimally. Also, we studied the fact that the
trade-off between the utility of the FC and the lifetime of
the sensor network can be achieved when the valuation of
the sensors depend on their residual energy. In the future, we
will study the mechanism design approach for the non-myopic
target tracking problem.
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